Two weeks ago, incumbent Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced his withdrawal from the premiership race. Amid political negotiations following the November elections, this move effectively paved the way for former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to return to power.
This development is not just an act of political recycling; it reflects the failure of Iraqi state-building after the United States invasion of 2003. Under al-Maliki, Iraq may well go back to the disastrous policies that in 2014 led to the rise of ISIL (ISIS).
Sectarian politics
In reflecting on what al-Maliki’s return could possibly mean for Iraq, it is important to examine his track record. In 2006, when he was first nominated for the prime minister’s post, the administration of US President George W Bush supported him. Washington did so in the name of stability and trust, despite the early red flags. By November 2006, just six months after al-Maliki came to power, US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley was already raising concerns about his ability to rein in violence against the Sunni population.
The decision by the Bush administration to continue its support for the prime minister reflects its own record of misguided policies, driven by ignorance of the region and its history. By backing al-Maliki, Washington paved the way for the chaos and instability it sought to avert.
During his first two terms, al-Maliki established a governance template that deliberately dismantled the post-2003 settlement’s vision of inclusive politics. He pursued policies of deliberate exclusion of the Sunni population on the political and social levels under the guise of de-Baathification. While originally intended to remove Saddam Hussein’s loyalists, the process was weaponised by al-Maliki as a sectarian tool. In 2010, for example, the prime minister used a de-Baathification law to ban nine parties and more than 450 candidates — predominantly Sunnis — from the parliamentary elections.
The security apparatus under his leadership also carried out arrests of moderate Sunni politicians on trumped-up charges of “terrorism” and suppressed peaceful demonstrations.
The 2013 massacre in the town of al-Hawija, in Kirkuk province, is a case in point. In January of that year, scores of Sunnis gathered for a peaceful protest of the discriminatory policies of al-Maliki’s government that lasted weeks. Three months later, security forces attacked the protest sit-in, killing at least 44 protesters.
Under al-Maliki, Baghdad also witnessed the deliberate displacement of Sunnis from their homes and the consolidation of Shia-dominated areas. This was a form of demographic engineering with the full support and complicity of the state.
As a result of these policies, sectarian politics escalated to the point where ethnic and religious identity became the main dividers of society, undermining national unity and plunging the country into civil conflict.
The constant assault on Sunni communities generated widespread discontent, which was easily exploited by extremist organisations – first al-Qaeda and then ISIL (ISIS).
Corruption and mismanagement
The industrial-scale haemorrhaging of national wealth during the al-Maliki era was nothing short of staggering. The Iraqi parliament’s own transparency commission estimated in 2018 that by then, $320bn had been lost to corruption since the US invasion; al-Maliki was in power for eight of those 15 years.
The money was used to fund the extravagant lifestyles of those close to al-Maliki, the purchase of expensive real estate, and deposits in shell companies and secret bank accounts. All of this is not a matter of administrative dysfunction but of large-scale thievery.
Iraq’s Federal Commission of Integrity carried out extensive documentation of such malpractices, but to this day, no one has been held accountable. Under al-Maliki, the independence of the judiciary was destroyed, rendering any process of accountability impossible.
Mismanagement also extended to the security and military forces. For years, the army was paying salaries to “ghost soldiers”; by 2014, the bill for this corruption scheme had grown to $380m a year. The prime minister himself was found to be running his own prison and commanding a special force of 3,000 soldiers loyal to him.
Years of corruption and dysfunction within the Iraqi army amid nearly $100bn in US funding led to the disaster of 2014, when military units dispersed in the face of advancing ISIL (ISIS) forces.
Al-Maliki’s return
Al-Maliki did not spend the past 11 years in political isolation. Instead, he was at the centre of the political machinery, plotting and lining up all the necessary components for his ultimate return under the watch of successive US administrations.
A third term for him would likely deepen sectarian divisions and entrench corruption. Iraqi governance will continue to be undermined by his tendencies to create shadow power structures in which loyalists are empowered at the expense of institutions.
Al-Maliki’s return would also be significant regionally. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the serious weakening of Hezbollah, Iraq has become Iran’s most critical regional security and financial asset.
Iran’s position in the region has not been this vulnerable in decades, but al-Maliki’s return would effectively preclude Iraq from embarking on a more independent path from Tehran in its domestic and foreign affairs.
His third term would also likely obstruct normalisation with Damascus. Al-Maliki has vocally opposed engaging Syria’s new leadership. Last year, he voiced his opposition to interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa attending the Arab League Summit in Baghdad and described him as “wanted by Iraqi courts on terrorism charges”.
In parallel, a new al-Maliki government would also pose a challenge to US interests. The appointment of Mark Savaya as a special envoy to Iraq by the administration of US President Donald Trump, the first such appointment in 20 years, demonstrated its intent on pushing through policies aimed at curbing Iranian influence.
Washington wants the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) dismantled and fully integrated into the Iraqi army. Al-Maliki is unlikely to undertake such a move because he is the “godfather” of these parallel armed structures. Dismantling them would mean destroying his own creation and severing his ties with Iran.
The issue at stake, however, is not just what policies al-Maliki will pursue. It is also the fact that Iraq is not able to escape a political cycle that has brought it nothing but catastrophe. It shows that the Iraqi political elite has learned nothing from the 2014 crisis.
Sectarian mobilisation and kleptocratic politics are still valid political options. Iraqi youth have repeatedly taken to the streets to protest this deeply flawed and dysfunctional status quo. Without significant changes to the incentive structure, accountability system, and sectarian distribution of power, Iraq is doomed to repeat the same grave mistakes of the past.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/1/25/what-al-malikis-return-would-mean-for-iraq-and-the-region?traffic_source=rss
