How ‘war on terror’ was fought, won in Southeast Asia – for now | Conflict News | USAEMALL.com

Medan, Indonesia – In the early 2000s, the potential for terror assaults in Southeast Asia appeared dramatically totally different from in the present day.

Indonesia was rocked by the Christmas Eve church bombings on December 24, 2000, that killed 18 individuals. Just six days later, Metro Manila in the Philippines skilled comparable bombings that killed 22 individuals.

In 2002, a sequence of bombings ripped by a preferred nightlife spot in Bali, Indonesia, killing greater than 200 individuals and leaving no less than one other 200 wounded.

In the next years, the JW Marriott Hotel, the Philippine Stock Exchange and the consulate, all in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta, had been attacked, as had been different areas throughout Southeast Asia.

The group accountable for the assaults, and others, was Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), whose members aspired to determine a hardline Islamic state in Indonesia and throughout wider Southeast Asia.

Often referred to by its initials, JI was alleged to have operatives in Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia and the Philippines, and was stated to be linked to different teams, together with al-Qaeda and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines’ Mindanao island.

Though JI was accountable for a protracted record of atrocities and a whole lot of casualties in the early 2000s – its final recorded assault was the bombing of a police compound in West Java province in 2011 – the group, and the worry of terror assaults, is basically forgotten in the area now.

So, how did Indonesia’s and different governments in Southeast Asia successfully curtail a regional risk whereas the United States-led “war on terror” left complete nations shattered and areas of the world in chaos following the September 11, 2001 assaults on the US?

“The early 2000s certainly felt dangerous at the time,” Zachary Abuza, a professor on the National War College in Washington, DC, informed Al Jazeera.

“But the Bali bombing really shook Indonesia out of its complacency. The new terrorism law changed the public perception of the perceived level of danger and the authorities had free rein to do their work without political interference,” Abuza stated.

‘It broke JI’s again’

At the time of the Bali bombings in late 2002, Indonesia didn’t have particular and focused antiterrorism laws, though this was rapidly drafted and signed into legislation in 2003 and utilized retroactively to among the perpetrators of the assault on the favored vacation island.

Three senior members of JI, Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi, had been rapidly arrested, prosecuted, and executed in 2008 for their roles in masterminding the bombings.

A fourth perpetrator, Ali Imron, was sentenced to life in jail.

In 2003, Hambali, a Malaysia-based member of JI, allegedly accountable for securing funding for the group, was arrested in Thailand after spending months hiding out in the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh.

Renditioned by the US, Hambali was tortured at CIA “black sites” earlier than being transferred to the US army’s infamous Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba the place he stays imprisoned to this present day for his alleged position in the Bali bombings.

Indonesia and different governments in the area continued to shut the online between JI members and their leaders.

In 2007, Abu Dujana, the top of JI’s army operations, was arrested. In 2010, Abu Bakar Bashir, the “spiritual head” of the organisation, was captured and sentenced to fifteen years in jail. He was launched early in January 2021.

“When people were arrested, it broke JI’s back,” Abuza stated.

“But JI as an organisation still existed and the government gave it ample space to exist, allowing it to run its madrasas [Islamic educational institutions], charities and businesses,” he stated.

The Indonesian authorities formally declared JI an unlawful organisation in 2008, however authorities took a extra measured method by persevering with to permit its members a level of autonomy offered they didn’t interact in violence.

‘Jihad as a spiritual struggle’

According to Farihin, a member of JI based mostly in Indonesia, the organisation stays energetic, though it has now modified its philosophy to one among pacifism and focuses on works akin to non secular instructing and different socially-minded causes.

“There is no focus on violence now,” he informed Al Jazeera.

“Only on jihad as a spiritual struggle to guard against our personal sins as individuals,” he stated.

“All religions have this concept in some form.”

While Farihin nonetheless describes himself as a member of JI, he stated the unique grouping has fractured and splintered many occasions through the years, owing to individuals having totally different views and opinions.

These variations of opinion are commonly cited as one more reason for the success of the regional method to the so-called “war on terror” – a mixture of inner political disputes and exterior safety operations.

By 2007, Abuza recounted, JI was “riddled by factionalism” as remaining members of the organisation jostled for energy and clashed on tips on how to create a blueprint for their operations transferring ahead.

“Abu Dujana had different ideas for the organisation and felt that bombing foreigners was not the way to achieve its aims,” Abuza stated.

“Enough people in JI thought it was best to lie low after the Bali bombing and that the attack had not been productive,” he stated.

“Abu Dujana was not arguing that killing foreigners was morally wrong, just that it was not productive as, with each attack and subsequent arrests, the organisation was getting weaker.”

Counterterrorism work continues

Indonesia additionally got here a great distance in regards to creating an efficient counterterrorism framework that has considerably weakened networks of potential attackers throughout the area, stated Alif Satria, a researcher on the division of politics and social change on the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia.

“First is the creation of Densus 88 in 2003 through the help of other countries. This has ensured that Indonesia has a well-functioning counterterrorism unit with the necessary intelligence and operational skills to dismantle networks,” Satria informed Al Jazeera.

Densus 88 or Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88, was a unit fashioned in 2003 beneath the umbrella of the National Police and was funded, geared up, and skilled in half by the US and Australia.

Satria added that one other milestone was the creation of Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) in 2010.

Deradicalisation programmes led by the police in the early 2000s had been additionally vital in guaranteeing that these arrested didn’t re-engage with hardline teams as soon as they had been launched.

“As a result, Indonesia has managed to keep its recidivism rate at around 11 percent,” he stated.

However, the counterterrorism work performed by the Indonesian authorities continues to be in progress.

Who will emerge subsequent?

Open-source knowledge assortment reveals that between 2021 and 2023, extra JI members had been arrested than members of different teams akin to Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), an ISIL-affiliated group accountable for current assaults in Indonesia and the broader area.

Some of the newer incidents embody the 2018 Surabaya bombings in which three Christian church buildings had been attacked in the town of Surabaya by a husband and spouse and their 4 youngsters, one among whom was simply 9 years outdated. Fifteen individuals had been killed.

The similar group was additionally behind the Jolo Cathedral bombings in Sulu in the Philippines in 2019 that killed 20 individuals.

“Between 2021 and 2023, there were some 610 people arrested, 42 percent of whom were JI and 39 percent JAD and other pro-Islamic State groups,” Satria stated.

“For me, that goes to show that, despite not conducting attacks, JI is very much still active, be it in conducting recruitment, fundraising or preparing for its regeneration,” he stated.

Abuza agreed with that cautious tone, saying the dearth of clear management on a world scale for hardline teams had additionally contributed to a basic sense of quintessence.

But that might rapidly change.

“These organisations are living organisations and respond to the external environment,” Abuza stated.

“Everyone is waiting to see what happens in the Middle East and who emerges as a leader,” he stated.

“Someone will,” he added.