LIMITS TO INDIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA
India’s relations with China should be considered in that same light. The ongoing diplomatic consultations are driven by the desire to de-escalate the border dispute, which threatened to boil over in 2020 and 2021.
But lowering the tensions does not mean settling the dispute, which remains a distant goal. The more realistic objective is to push the issue into the background to protect trade relations between the two countries. In 2025, China remained India’s second-largest trading partner.
But the border issues aside, other security concerns put limitations on Indian engagement with China. Beijing’s enduring military cooperation with Islamabad is one problem. During the conflict in May this year, Pakistan reportedly used Chinese-made fighter jets, missiles, and drones against India, enabling Islamabad to shoot down Indian aircraft.
China’s maritime presence throughout the Indian Ocean region also worries India. The establishment of a PLA military base in Djibouti, alongside Chinese participation in port infrastructure projects in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia, exacerbates fears in India of encirclement.
So, the consequences of an India-China thaw should not be overstated. It would undoubtedly be a positive sign if diplomats of both countries can negotiate a way to de-escalate their military standoff in the Himalayas. But this is not a significant shift in the US-China-India triangle, which was always more volatile than strategists in Washington appeared to anticipate.
Jean-Loup Samaan is Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore. This commentary first appeared on Lowy Institute’s The Interpreter.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/modi-xi-meet-sco-summit-india-china-us-ties-5322176
