Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore (NUS) and a non-resident scholar at Carnegie China, said the headline figure only tells part of the story.
“The PRC’s (calculus) is (linked) – since it would likely want to plan for some escalation if they decided to use force even more directly against Taiwan, in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, or even the Yellow Sea,” he told CNA.
“Taiwan is not the only area where the PLA is currently acting to pursue PRC claims and where escalation is possible.”
Chong stressed that the PLA’s political role must also be taken into account when interpreting spending priorities, highlighting that it is the armed wing of China’s Communist Party (CCP) and “not a national army”.
“That means that a core function of the PLA is to protect the interests and survival of the (CCP),” he said, adding that one way it does so is by emphasising the party’s leadership.
“To the extent that asserting control over claimed territory is key to (CCP) legitimacy, the (CCP) will ensure that the PLA is in a position to follow its directives.”
Michael Clarke, an associate professor at Deakin University’s Centre for Future Defence and National Security, said observers should look beyond the topline and examine how funds are distributed.
“Like other defence budgets … it is always useful to follow the money to ascertain priorities,” he told CNA.
“In the PLA’s case, the bulk of the budget is accounted for by three core areas – equipment, personnel and training, and maintenance.”
A key signal to watch is whether these proportions shift significantly toward any one of the three or remain relatively consistent, Clarke said.
China does not provide a detailed breakdown of its military spending.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-defence-budget-2026-military-modernisation-national-security-5967776
