Islamabad, Pakistan – When the United Nations Security Council on Monday adopted a United States-authored resolution that paves the way for a transitional administration and an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza, Pakistan – which was presiding over the council – had a seemingly contradictory response.
Asim Iftikhar Ahmed, Pakistan’s permanent representative to the UN, thanked the US for tabling the resolution and voted in its favour. But he also said Pakistan was not entirely satisfied with the outcome, and warned that “some critical suggestions” from Pakistan were not included in the final text.
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Though the resolution promises a “credible pathway” to Palestinian statehood, Ahmed, in his comments to the council, said it did not spell that path out, and did not clarify the role of the UN, a proposed Board of Peace (BoP) to oversee Gaza’s governance, or the mandate of the ISF.
“Those are all crucial aspects with a bearing on the success of this endeavour. We earnestly hope that further details in coming weeks will provide the much-needed clarity on these issues,” he said.
But the country had already endorsed US President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza ceasefire plan in September – the basis for the UN resolution. And while several other Arab and Muslim countries have also cautiously supported the resolution, Pakistan, with the largest army among them, is widely expected to play a key role in the ISF.
The vote in favour of the resolution, coupled with the suggestions that Pakistan still has questions it needs answers to, represents a careful tightrope walk that Islamabad will need to navigate as it faces questions at home over possible military deployment in Gaza, say analysts.
“The US playbook is clear and has a pro-Israel tilt. Yet, we need to recognise that this is the best option that we have,” Salman Bashir, former Pakistani foreign secretary, told Al Jazeera. “After the sufferings inflicted on the people of Gaza, we did not have any option but to go along.”
Pakistan’s rising geopolitical value
In recent weeks, Pakistan’s top leaders have engaged in hectic diplomacy with key Middle Eastern partners.
Last weekend, Jordan’s King Abdullah II visited Islamabad and met Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir, the army chief. Munir had earlier travelled to Amman in October, as well as to Cairo in Egypt.
Pakistan has traditionally had close relations with Gulf states, and those ties have tightened amid Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza. Pakistan has long called for “Palestinian self-determination and the establishment of a sovereign, independent and contiguous State of Palestine based on pre-1967 borders with al-Quds al-Sharif [Jerusalem] as its capital”.
But in recent weeks, Pakistan – the only Muslim nation with nuclear weapons – has also emerged as a key actor in the region’s security calculations, courted by both the United States and important Arab allies.
In September, Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia, days after Israel had struck Doha, the Qatari capital. Then, in October, Prime Minister Sharif and Field Marshal Munir joined Trump and a bevy of other world leaders in Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheikh for the formal signing ceremony of the Gaza ceasefire agreement. Sharif lavished Trump with praise on the occasion.
By then, Trump had already described Munir as his “favourite field marshal”. Following a brief escalation with India in May, during which Pakistan said it shot down Indian jets, Munir met Trump in the Oval Office in June, an unprecedented visit for a serving Pakistani military chief who is not head of state.
In late September, Munir visited Washington again, this time with Sharif. The prime minister and army chief met Trump and promoted potential investment opportunities, including Pakistan’s rare earth minerals.
Now, Pakistan’s government is mulling its participation in the ISF. Though the government has not made any decision, senior officials have publicly commented favourably about the idea. “If Pakistan has to participate in it, then I think it will be a matter of pride for us,” Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said on October 28. “We will be proud to do it.”
That’s easier said than done, cautioned some analysts.
Palestine is an emotive issue in Pakistan, which does not recognise Israel. The national passport explicitly states it cannot be used for travel to Israel, and any suggestion of military cooperation with Israeli forces – or even de facto recognition of Israel – remains politically fraught.
That makes the prospect of troop deployment to Gaza a highly sensitive subject for politicians and the military alike.
Government keeps cards close to chest
Officially, the government has been opaque about its position on joining the ISF.
Even while describing any participation in the force as a cause for pride, Defence Minister Asif said the government would consult parliament and other institutions before making any decision.
“The government will take a decision after going through the process, and I don’t want to preempt anything,” he said.
In a weekly press briefing earlier this month, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Tahir Andrabi said the question of Pakistan’s contribution would be decided “after consultation at the highest level”.
“The decision will be taken in due course, as and when required. Certain level of leadership has stated that the decision will be taken with the advice of the government,” he said.
Al Jazeera reached out to Asif, the defence minister, Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, and the military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations, but received no response.
Legal, operational ambiguities
Some retired senior officers say Pakistan will not decide the matter behind closed doors.
Muhammad Saeed, a three-star general who served as Chief of General Staff until his 2023 retirement, said he expects the terms of reference and rules of engagement for any ISF deployment to be debated in public forums, including Pakistan’s National Security Council and parliament.
“This is such a sensitive topic; it has to be debated publicly, and no government can possibly keep it under wraps. So once the ISF structure becomes clear, I am certain that Pakistani decision-making will be very inclusive and the public will know about the details,” he told Al Jazeera.
Kamran Bokhari, senior director at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington, DC, said the mutual defence agreement with Saudi Arabia meant that Pakistani troops in Gaza would likely be representing both countries. He, however, added that Pakistan would likely have participated in the ISF even without the Saudi pact.
Still, the lack of details about the ISF and Gaza’s governance in the UN resolution remains a stumbling block, say experts.
Several countries on the council said the resolution left key elements ambiguous, including the composition, structure and terms of reference for both the BoP and the ISF. China, which abstained, also described the text as “vague and unclear” on critical elements.
The resolution asks for the Gaza Strip to be “demilitarised” and for the “permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups”, a demand that Hamas has rejected.
Hamas said the resolution failed to meet Palestinian rights and sought to impose an international trusteeship on Gaza that Palestinians and resistance factions oppose.
So far, the US has sent nearly 200 personnel, including a general, to establish a Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) near Gaza on Israeli territory. The centre will monitor humanitarian aid and act as a base from which the ISF is expected to operate.
US-based media outlet Politico reported last month that Pakistan, Azerbaijan and Indonesia – all Muslim-majority states – were among the top contenders to supply troops for the ISF.
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates, which joined the Abraham Accords in 2020 and recognised Israel in Trump’s first tenure, has said it will not participate until there is clarity on the legal framework.
King Abdullah of Jordan also warned that without a clear mandate for the ISF, it would be difficult to make the plan succeed.
Costs, incentives and Pakistan’s historical role
Bokhari argued Pakistan has limited options, adding that many of its close allies are “deeply committed” to the initiative and have sought Islamabad’s participation.
“Pakistan’s economic and financial problems mean it will need to reciprocate militarily in order to secure” the goodwill of the US and Islamabad’s Gulf allies, he said. “We have to assume that the current civilian-military leadership is aware of the domestic political risks.”
Others point to Pakistan’s long experience with UN peacekeeping. As of September 2025, UN figures show Pakistan has contributed more than 2,600 personnel to UN missions, just below Indonesia’s 2,700, ranking Pakistan sixth overall.
Qamar Cheema, executive director of the Islamabad-based Sanober Institute, said Pakistan has emerged as a security stabiliser for the Middle East and has “extensive experience of providing support in conflict zones in the past”.
Pakistan currently faces security challenges on both its borders – with India to its east and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to the west. But it “may not have to cut troops from its eastern or western borders, since the number of troops [needed in Gaza] may not be that big, as various countries are also sending troops,” Cheema told Al Jazeera.
Saeed, the retired general, said Pakistan’s historic position on Palestine remained intact and that its prior peacekeeping experience meant that its troops were well-equipped to help the ISF.
“Pakistan has one of the richest experiences when it comes to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement through the UN. We have a sizeable force, with a variety of experience in maintaining peace and order,” he said.
“The hope is that we can perhaps provide help that can eliminate the violence, lead to peace, bring humanitarian aid in Gaza and implement the UN resolution,” the former general said.
Domestic political risks and the Israeli factor
Despite those arguments, many in Pakistan question the feasibility – and political acceptability – of serving alongside or coordinating with Israeli forces.
Bashir, the former foreign secretary, acknowledged the risks and said the demand that Hamas deweaponise made the ISF “a difficult mission”.
Still, he said, “realism demands that we go along with a less than perfect solution”.
Bokhari of New Lines Institute said stakeholders often sort out details “on the go” in the early stages of such missions.
“Of course, there is no way Pakistan or any other participating nation can avoid coordinating with Israel,” he said.
Saeed, however, disagreed. He said ISF would likely be a coalition in which one partner coordinates any dealings with Israeli forces, meaning Pakistani troops might not have direct contact with Israel.
“There are other countries potentially part of ISF who have relations with Israel. It is likely they will take the commanding role in ISF, and thus they will be the ones to engage with them, and not Pakistan,” he said. He added Pakistan’s involvement – if it happens – would be narrowly focused on maintaining the ceasefire and protecting Palestinian lives.
But Omar Mahmood Hayat, another retired three-star general, warned that any operational tie to Israel “will ignite domestic backlash and erode public trust”.
Hayat said Pakistan has no diplomatic ties with Israel “for principled reasons” and that blurring that line, even citing humanitarian considerations, would invite domestic confusion and controversy.
“This is not just a moral dilemma, but it is also a strategic contradiction,” he said. “It weakens our diplomatic posture.”
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/22/can-pakistan-join-the-gaza-stabilisation-force-without-facing-backlash?traffic_source=rss
