Wagner vs Africa Corps: The way forward for Russian paramilitaries in Mali | Military News | USAEMALL.com

This month, the Russian mercenary outfit Wagner Group announced its total withdrawal from Mali, claiming it had completed its mission after three and a half years of operations in the West African country.

For years, Wagner had been battling rebels and armed groups on behalf of the Malian government, as well as asserting Russia’s interests in the Sahel.

But as Wagner leaves, security advisers from the Africa Corps, a Kremlin-controlled paramilitary group, will remain in their place, ensuring a lingering presence of Russian forces.

So, what does this change mean for Mali, and is there a difference between the two Russian paramilitary groups and their mission in Africa?

An ‘anti-Western coalition’?

Mali’s government has, for decades, been embroiled in a conflict with ethnic Tuareg separatists in the Sahara Desert, as well as fighters affiliated with ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda.

Previously, French forces assisted the Malian government, but they withdrew after a military coup in 2021. The latest round of fighting erupted in 2023 when Bamako’s military government mounted a new offensive against the rebels.

“The Malian junta invited Wagner and Russia to support them in Mali – this really stemmed from frustration with the [military] support provided by France and other Western partners,” Flore Berger, a senior analyst at the Global Initiative’s North Africa and Sahel Observatory, told Al Jazeera.

“They felt that, despite years of help, the security situation hadn’t improved, and Western countries kept pressuring them to return to civilian rule, organise elections, etc. Russia, through Wagner, on the other hand, offered support without those conditions. It was seen as a more respectful and reliable partner that wouldn’t interfere in Mali’s political choices.”

The separation from France also appeared to bolster Malian sovereignty.

“France is Mali’s former colonial overlord and there’s a tense relationship, to say the least,” International Crisis Group’s Sahel researcher Franklin Nossiter told Al Jazeera.

“Long story short, they break up, and Mali kicks out the French troops … The deployment in Mali was pretty opportunistic, upstaging the West; it was a big black eye for France.”

While Moscow maintained an active presence in Africa during the Cold War, its footprint diminished in the post-communist collapse of the 1990s as Russia dealt with its own problems. But it has been revived in recent years, as President Vladimir Putin has sought a more assertive role on the world stage.

“The original push into Africa largely came through Wagner,” said John Lechner, author of Death Is Our Business: Russian Mercenaries And The New Era Of Private Warfare.

“Over time, as the programme became successful … the interest within the Kremlin more broadly grew, especially after the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, when it was a useful narrative that not only is Russia not isolated, but there are African countries that continue to seek its assistance.”

Experts say mercenaries have been a tool of Russian interests in Africa, capitalising on discontent with the former colonial and neocolonial powers, as well as offering security in exchange for resources, especially in the Central African Republic. This was less so in Mali, however, where, despite some small-scale gold mining operations, some Wagnerites were so hard-pressed for cash they were purportedly pictured selling discount canned sardines at local markets. There, the priority was seemingly more about Russian influence over the Sahel.

“Now, it is exclusively a question of geopolitics, ousting the collective West from Africa, creating an anti-Western coalition,” explained Sergey Eledinov, a former Russian peacekeeper turned independent Africa specialist based in Dakar, Senegal.

The Ukraine factor

Last year saw another foreign player appear in the Malian conflict.

A contingent of Wagner and Malian troops was ambushed by Tuareg rebels in Tinzaouaten, near the Algerian border, in July, claiming the lives of 84 Russian mercenaries and 47 Malian soldiers, including Nikita Fedyanin, a blogger behind the Wagner-linked Telegram channel, Grey Zone.

Ukraine’s spy agency, the GUR, admitted it provided crucial intelligence to the rebels against Russia. There were also reports that Ukrainians taught the rebels how to operate drones.

In response, Mali broke off diplomatic relations with Ukraine.

“We’re not really sure if it’s still ongoing,” Nossiter said about Ukraine’s support.

“At the time, there were reports that other Ukrainian allies were pressuring Ukrainians not to do that,” he explained, noting that the perceived “close ties between the jihadist groups and some of the separatists” may have made Kyiv’s Western backers nervous.

Now, given recent upsetting defeats against Malian and Russian troops, and the intensifying violence in northern Mali, it’s questionable to many whether Wagner’s mission was a success.

“The biggest crowning victory of the Malian military in the last couple of years was retaking this town, Kidal [in 2023], which was a long-time separatist stronghold,” Nossiter said. “It’s the kind of victory people point to and say: without Wagner, it wouldn’t have been possible.”

But at the same time, insecurity continues to be a major challenge, the Sahel researcher emphasised.

“The jihadists, just in the last two weeks, have attacked three major Malian military camps. They also attacked the city of Timbuktu, and they put an IED [improvised explosive device] at a joint Malian-Wagner training camp just outside of the capital city of Bamako,” he said.

Meanwhile, the mercenaries have been accused of the deliberate deaths and disappearances of civilians in their counter-rebellion campaign. In February, a Tuareg convoy returning from a wedding reportedly came under fire from Wagner and Malian forces, killing at least 20 civilians, including children and elderly people.

“Overall, the Russian presence has helped the junta stay in power and appear strong, but it hasn’t solved the deeper security problems, and it’s led to more isolation from the West and international aid,” added Berger.

The Russian position has also been weakened by developments elsewhere.

“Russia’s position has become more precarious following the collapse of key logistics hubs in Syria, specifically the Tartous port and Khmeimim airbase, after the downfall of its protege Bashar al-Assad,” noted Alessandro Arduino, author of Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones, and the Future of War.

More than just ‘Wagner rebranded’

In 2023, then-Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin mutinied against the Russian military leadership before he subsequently perished in a suspicious plane crash in August that year. Fearing another uprising, the Kremlin reined in Wagner and other paramilitaries, which have since been more tightly integrated into the command structure and the Africa Corps rose to prominence.

According to Eledinov, this sparked some tension.

“Some of the Wagner fighters went over to the Africa Corps, but most of them stayed to serve in the assault squads,” he said.

“After the death of Prigozhin, the majority of fighters and commanders did not want to go over to the Africa Corps, as a result of which the Wagner assault squads remained in Mali to this day. I assume that now they had no choice [but to withdraw].”

While there’s substantial overlap between the two paramilitary groups, with some estimates claiming 70-80 percent of Africa Corps personnel being Wagner veterans, they are different organisations.

“A lot of reporting on this – especially in the early months after Africa Corps was first announced – assumed that Africa Corps and Wagner were the same thing, and that AC was just Wagner ‘rebranded’,” said Julia Stanyard, another analyst at the Global Initiative.

“In fact, they are separate entities. Africa Corps is more closely managed by the Russian Ministry of Defence and [Russia’s military intelligence agency], the GRU, than Wagner ever was. However, they do have similarities, and many of those recruited to Africa Corps, including many of their commanding officers, are former Wagner mercenaries.”

While Wagner actively engaged on the battlefield, the Africa Corps is set to serve in a more advisory capacity.

“Even after the death of Prigozhin and his mutiny, the Russian government is formalising its presence in the Sahel,” Lechner observed.

“It will be interesting to see how, now that Africa Corps is fully taking over the mission, to what extent Russia’s military presence will have a different character within Mali. The Wagner units were extremely aggressive, operationally very often independent, often going out in direct combat on their own without even being accompanied by [Malian soldiers]. Africa Corps has been designed as more of a training mission, a force that is supposed to protect fixed assets. And it will probably be more bureaucratic because it’s part of the MOD and risk-averse.”

Although Wagner served Russian interests, as mercenaries, they still allowed the Kremlin plausible deniability.

“If earlier, everyone understood that Wagner was Russia, but formally, it was a private company, now, it is entirely Russia. And accordingly, Russia bears much more responsibility [for] all the ensuing consequences, namely purges of civilians, looting and so on,” said Eledinov.

“There is no military resolution to this conflict by force. Without negotiations, it only escalates the degree of the conflict.”